The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy by Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Federal Civil Service System and The Problem of Bureaucracy
Volume Author/Editor: Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-40170-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/john94-1
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest
Group
Chapter Author: Ronald N. Johnson, Gary D. Libecap
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8637
Chapter pages in book: (p. 126 - 153)6  Explaining the Success of 
Federal Employees as an Interest 
Group 
6.1  Introduction 
A major hypothesis advanced in this volume is that civil service reform al- 
lowed federal workers to become an entrenched special interest group of their 
own. The evidence presented  in the previous two chapters suggests that they 
have been successful at increasing their compensation and job benefits relative 
to comparable private- and other public-sector workers, thus raising the ques- 
tion of how this record of successes was achieved. Clearly, there are fundamen- 
tal  differences  in employer/employee bargaining  in the federal sector com- 
paed to that  in the private sector.  Because  negotiations  over pay  and civil 
service rules involve politicians and take place in the political arena, the ob- 
served differences between private and federal workers may be due to the vo- 
ting power of the latter. The accomplishments of federal employees may also 
be due to the lobbying strength of federal unions in obtaining favorable statutes 
regarding the civil service system. In this chapter, we examine both the voting 
and the lobby lobbying influence of federal employees. 
Voting power has received most of the attention. For example, Richard Free- 
man has noted, ‘‘Public sector unions, more so than private sector unions, can 
influence the employer’s behavior through the political process. The principal 
reason for this is that public sector employees help elect both the executive and 
legislative branches of government” (1986,42). Since public-sector employees 
help elect politicians, they are in a position to use their voting power to set the 
agenda at the bargaining table, and politicians have incentives to be responsive. 
In addition, there is an extensive literature that argues that public-sector em- 
ployees are strongly motivated to use their voting power to elect candidates 
who support the expansion  of  government (see Downs 1967; Tullock  1974; 
Buchanan 1977; Bush and Denzau 1977; and Bennett and Orzechowski 1983). 
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The notion is that the salaries of these public-sector employees will increase 
with the growth of government. 
With over 3 million full- and part-time federal civilian employees, federal 
workers clearly constitute a potentially powerful  voting block. Nevertheless, 
we argue that there are a number of offsetting factors that limit the ability of 
federal workers to act as a cohesive voting force. First, with the exception of 
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, the federal labor force is geographi- 
cally dispersed. Not only does this dispersion tend to dilute these workers' 
voting power, but it also increases the potential for free riding by  raising the 
costs of  collective action.'  Second, because federal workers are highly  pro- 
tected by bureaucratic rules, they have less incentive to vote than if they were 
subject to political removals, as are patronage workers or other political ap- 
pointees. Indeed, we show that the probability that a federal worker votes in a 
general election is no higher than that for a comparable private-sector  worker. 
In contrast, the probability that a state or local government employee votes is 
significantly  higher than that for a federal worker. Moreover, the number of 
employees in the state and local sector has grown far more rapidly over the 
past forty years than has federal employment. Even  so, despite lower voter 
participation rates and slower growth, the empirical evidence indicates that the 
salary of a typical federal worker exceeds that of state and local employees by 
a substantial margin and that this wage advantage has persisted over time.2 
These findings present a challenge to conventional arguments that stress the 
roles of voting power and the growth of government as central for understand- 
ing the relative successes of federal government employees. Although it is un- 
likely that the expansion of the federal sector would have had a negative effect 
on salaries, the evidence indicates that government growth is neither a neces- 
sary nor a sufficient condition for generating higher salaries for federal civilian 
employees. Instead of government expansion, the most important factor in ex- 
plaining the comparative achievements of federal workers has been their abil- 
ity to change civil service rules through statutes and (occasionally) executive 
orders to better reflect their interests. They have accomplished that objective 
through effective lobbying by federal employee unions. 
In this regard, federal unions have acted much like other interest  groups, 
promising votes and contributing money to campaigns. They too have bene- 
fited because they bargain at the national level, where the mobility of taxable 
resources is restricted relative to those of state and local entities. In bargaining 
with their employees over compensation plans, and in taking other actions that 
affect tax rates, state and local government officials must consider competing 
jurisdictions.  High taxes in one region encourage firm migration to other re- 
gions. This is a less relevant concern for federal officials. Further, in their lob- 
bying  efforts, federal employee unions have been  assisted by  private-sector 
unions.  Since  resource  mobility  is  of  less  concern  to  federal  politicians, 
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plies to most jurisdictions and legislation for federal employees because of 
the precedents that can be established for private workers. Accordingly, our 
explanation for the success of federal workers in obtaining attractive levels of 
compensation and workplace benefits emphasizes the attributes that have made 
them an effective interest group. Voting power is but one of  those attributes, 
and the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that it has been overempha- 
sized in the literature as an explanation for public-sector wage patterns. 
6.2  The Voting Power of Federal Employees 
One of  the distinguishing features of  the public choice paradigm is the as- 
sumption that individuals in the political arena, as in the marketplace, behave 
rationally and pursue their own self-interests. An  excellent example of  this 
approach is the hypothesis advanced by Anthony Downs that rational, utility- 
maximizing citizens would calculate relevant benefits and costs in  deciding 
whether to vote. The fortunes of those in both the private and the public sectors 
are of course likely affected by  who wins an election, but Downs argued that 
government employees had an especially strong incentive to vote because their 
incomes were  closely tied  to  the  outcome (Downs  1957, 254). As  it has 
evolved, the hypothesis that government employees should have higher voter 
participation rates than the general population rests on the fundamental tenet 
that there is a positive relation between a public employee’s income and the 
growth of  the public  sector. Because of  that  asserted relation, government 
workers are assumed to be more motivated than are their counterparts in the 
private sector to participate in political campaigns and to vote for those candi- 
dates who advocate an expansion of government services. Indeed, the idea that 
government workers would have higher voter participation rates, with an im- 
plied preference for government expansion, has been a major theme in much 
of the literature on the growth of g~vernment.~ 
In this section, we first review the evidence on public-sector voter participa- 
tion rates. We  then offer explanations for why federal workers are less likely 
to vote than are their state and local sector counterparts. As a result, we con- 
clude that the voting power of  federal workers cannot explain their wage ad- 
vantage over state and local government employees and that we must look else- 
where to explain their political influence. 
6.2.1  Public-Sector Voter Participation Rates 
One of the earliest studies of voter behavior is Martin’s  (1933) analysis of 
local elections in Austin, Texas. His findings revealed a voter participation rate 
of 87 percent for public employees but only 58 percent for the general public. 
Although Martin’s study was very limited in its scope, later studies have been 
supportive of  his findings. James Bennett and William Orzechowski (1983), 
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years 1964-78.  Their study indicated that voter participation rates for all public 
employees-federal,  state, and local-were  approximately 18 percent higher 
than that for the general public. More recently, we  used Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data tapes containing information on individual voter behavior 
for the  1984 and  1986 national elections to  examine public-sector voting 
(Johnson and Libecap 1991). The calculated voter participation rates in 1984, 
measured as the number in a particular sample subgroup who stated that they 
had voted divided by  the total population of the subgroup, were 77.1 percent 
for federal employees, 81.3 percent for state employees, 85.8 percent for local 
government employees, and 65.2 percent for private-sector employees. For the 
1986 elections, the figures were 55.4 percent for federal workers, 69.1 percent 
for state employees, 72.4 percent for local government workers, and 46.7 per- 
cent for private-sector employees. 
These results seem to indicate that public-sector employees have  higher 
voter participation rates than do their counterparts in the private sector. If the 
federal relative wage advantage over state and local government workers is to 
be explained by voting power, it must follow that federal workers have higher 
voting participation rates than do their colleagues. The data, however, indicate 
just the opposite, that federal workers have lower, not higher, voter participa- 
tion rates than other public-sector employees. 
Although highly suggestive, the participation rates referred to above do not 
control for the various attributes of the voters. Within the context of Downs’s 
model of voter participation, what matters is the marginal effect of a variable, 
ceteris paribus. That is, the correct test of  the hypothesis posed by  Downs 
requires an answer to the question, Do public-sector workers have an added 
incentive to vote? Accordingly, when testing the hypothesis, it is important to 
control for other differences in voter attributes that are likely to affect observed 
voter turnout. A number of studies have used estimating procedures that ac- 
count for the effect of  other variables besides occupation. One of  the most 
noted studies is that of Raymond Wolfinger and S. J. Rosenstone (1980). In 
their extensive study of voting behavior, Wolfinger and Rosenstone use a probit 
model and CPS data to estimate the propensity of  certain groups to vote. In- 
cluded in their estimating equations are a broad array of individual socioeco- 
nomic characteristics, such as level of  education. For the 1974 national elec- 
tions, they find that the marginal increase in  the probability of  voting for 
teachers and federal employees, relative to private-sector employees, is only 5 
percent. On the other hand, the marginal increases in voting for state and local 
employees, compared with private-sector employees, are 13 and 17 percent, re- 
spectively. 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s results suggest a smaller overall effect of gov- 
ernment employment on the decision to vote than do the simple voter participa- 
tion  figures, but the pattern across political entities remains. Despite their 
grouping of federal employees and teachers, the probability of voting appears 
to be higher for state and local employees than for federal workers. Since many 130  Chapter6 
teachers are also local government  employees,  it is important to  isolate the 
voting patterns of federal government workers. 
Following Wolfinger and Rosenstone, we utilized a standard probit model 
and CPS data files for November  1984 and 1986 that contained special sub- 
sample surveys on whether individuals voted (Johnson and Libecap 1991). In- 
cluded in the estimating equations were variables measuring each individual’s 
education, age, marital status, sex, union membership, race, earnings, and oc- 
cupation. The probit estimates of the coefficients for the local, state, and fed- 
eral employee identifiers are reported in table 6.1. The results for all the in- 
cluded variables are shown in appendix D. The excluded category is private- 
sector employees. For both  1984 and  1986, the results indicate that federal 
employment does not significantly increase the probability of voting, relative 
to individuals employed in the private sector. The sign of the coefficient on 
the federal employment variable for 1986 actually  is negative, although not 
statistically different from zero. In contrast, the coefficients on the state and 
local identifiers are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, one- 
tail test. 
The marginal effects, obtained using the estimated parameters of the probit 
equation, are reported in table 6.2. These results indicate a much smaller effect 
of state and local government employment on the probability of voting than 
the corresponding figures of 13 and 17 percent reported by Wolfinger and Ro- 
senstone (1980,  101). In addition, the results shown in table 6.2 indicate that 
federal workers are not compelled by  some added incentive to vote more fre- 
quently than their counterparts in the private ~ector.~  Thus, whether one consid- 
ers the marginal effects or the basic statistics on voter participation rates, all 
the available evidence  points in the same direction; namely, state and local 
employees are more likely to vote than are federal workers. 
6.2.2  Comparing the Incentives of Public-Sector Employees to Vote 
One possible explanation for why federal workers have lower voter partici- 
pation rates than do state or local employees is the geographic distribution of 
Table 6.1  Probit Estimates of the Effect of Public-Sector Employment 
on Voting 
1984  1986 
Variable  Elections  Elections 
Federal  .058  -.032 
(.73)  (- .38) 
State  .160  ,282 
(1 38)  (3.74) 
Local  .279  ,312 
(4.32)  (4.85) 
Source: Johnson and Libecap (1991). 
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Table 6.2  Marginal Effects on Voting Participation by Level of Government 
Increase in the Probability of 
Voting Relative to Private-Sector 
Employees (in percentage terms) 
Election  Federal  State  Local 
1984  1.59  3.96  6.21 
1986  -1.12  9.08  9.11 
Source: Johnson and Libecap (1991). 
the federal civilian workforce. If federal workers are to be an effective block, 
either in voting for president or in collectively determining a slate of favorable 
congressional candidates, they would have to overcome the tendency to free 
ride.5 Peer-group pressure or explicit monitoring by  federal unions and em- 
ployee groups to limit shirking, however, are options, but they are unlikely to 
be effective  because  federal  workers  are  so  geographically  dispersed.  Al- 
though approximately 12 percent of all federal civilian employees work within 
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, most of the rest are located uniformly 
across the country. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of federal employees by 
congressional district. Note that there are only ten districts, out of a total 435, 
with fewer than 3,000 federal employees and only nine districts with more than 
24,000 federal employees in residence.6 
With the exception of a few congressional districts, most of which are lo- 
cated close to the Washington, D.C., area, this dispersion means that federal 
employees are’not a sufficiently large portion of the labor force to wield sub- 
stantial voting power. Even in districts where their numbers are relatively large, 
federal employees may exert little influence in Congress. For example, the con- 
gressional delegate from the District of Columbia,  where federal employees 
constituent almost 30 percent of the total workforce, is a nonvoting member of 
Congress. Moreover, to the extent that a federal worker did desire to vote for a 
congressional candidate who favored the expansion of his or her agency, there 
may be few opportunities to do so. Given  their geographic  dispersion, it is 
likely that only a small percentage of federal employees will reside in the dis- 
trict or state of those members of Congress who sit on important agency review 
committees. Given these conditions and the potential for free riding to occur, 
it is not surprising that the results in tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate that the mar- 
ginal effect of federal employment on the probability of voting is insignificant. 
Besides  group  dispersion,  there  is  another  reason  why  federal  workers 
would be less motivated to vote than are state and local employees. The former 
have been subject to much less patronage pressure than the latter. Although, as 
we discuss in chapter 8, recent  Supreme Court rulings have greatly limited 
patronage practices, patronage remained a factor for state and local govern- 
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Fig. 6.1  Federal civilian employment by congressional district. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, (1983). 
age, public-sector employees who owe their positions to political sponsors 
have a relatively greater stake in the outcome of an election than do those who 
haie no such ties. In 1970, over 92 percent of all federal workers were within 
the classified or merit system (U.S. Department of  Commerce 1975, 1102). 
As indicated in chapter 5, civil service rules protect federal employees from 
reductions in force and other adverse election outcomes. Of the remaining fed- 
eral employees not covered by  merit rules, most are in positions that are not 
considered political in  nature and, hence, are unlikely  to  be  affected by  a 
change in administrations, at least, purely on the basis of  party membership. 
To be sure, there are a limited number of federal political appointments at the 
senior level whose positions are temporary, lasting only as long as the adminis- 
tration. Presently, approximately 5,000 positions are available to the president 
for political appointments (see Pfiffner 1987). 
Accordingly, should there be a change in the party controlling the White 
House, the vast majority of federal employees need not fear for their jobs. State 
and local government employees, however, have  had  much less protection. 
Rabin et al. (1985, 58) claim that only about 65 percent of  state and local 
employees are covered under merit-system rules, and Glenn Stahl (1983, 47) 
notes that, at the state and local level, the mere presence of a merit-system law 
does not always provide security from changes in administration. In compari- 
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less incentive to vote because of the widespread coverage of the civil service 
system and the comprehensive protections it provides. 
So far, we have focused on the reasons why most rank-and-file federal em- 
ployees would have less reason to vote in elections. It is time now to return to 
Downs’s hypothesis to analyze the reasons underlying the prediction of greater 
voting participation by government employees.  A basic tenet in much of the 
literature on bureaucratic behavior is that government workers are more moti- 
vated to vote than are private-sector workers because their career advancement 
and salaries depend on the growth of government. 
There is support for this notion from the private  sector. As described  by 
Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore (197 l), promotional opportunities are an 
integral part of internal labor markets, and advancement is often tied to the 
performance of the firm. There is also evidence indicating a positive relation 
between  salary increases  and organizational  growth  in large, private-sector 
firms (see Rosenbaum  1979). The pyramidal job structure described by Doer- 
inger and Piore is assumed implicitly by those who assert significant positive 
relations  among the growth of  government, salaries, and the corresponding 
incentive for public-sector employees to vote. For example, Bennett and Or- 
zechowski stated that, “as the firm (bureau) grows and new jobs are created, 
there is an increase  in the  likelihood of an employee (bureaucrat) rising  to 
another position  within the firm (bureau) where wages and productivity  are 
higher.” They emphasized that,  “in the public sector, the effect is of greater 
importance because bureaucrats, as a voting block, can have an important in- 
fluence on the outcome of elections” (1983, 272). 
At  first  glance,  the  federal  civil  service  system,  especially  for General 
Schedule (GS) employees, appears to be a classic internal labor market, with 
salaries a function of the position rather than of individual characteristics. Sala- 
ries increase as individuals move to higher positions within the hierarchy. We 
have examined the growth-salary relation in the federal government (Johnson 
and Libecap 1989a). A sample of 15,000 General Schedule employees in 1980 
and in  1985 was used to test whether agency growth had a significant effect 
on salaries within the agency.8  The data set and controlling variables used were 
similar to those described in appendix C. The research approach entailed pool- 
ing both data sets for 1980 and 1985 and introducing a set of dummy variables 
for the forty-five federal agencies within the sample. Since the dependent vari- 
able was the natural logarithm of individual wages, the inclusion of agency 
identifiers  provided  estimises of percentage  changes in earnings  associated 
with each agency over the five-year period. 
Various estimating procedures were employed to examine the relation be- 
tween changes in agency earnings and agency employment growth. In only 
one of the numerous tests performed did agency growth have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on salaries between 1980 and 1985. Even there, 
however, the effect was very small. On the basis of the estimated relation, an 
agency would have to double its size in order for salaries to increase by 4.4 134  Chapter6 
percent, relative to an agency that did not grow. Moreover, when the Depart- 
ment of  Defense  was excluded from this  particular  sample, agency  growth 
failed to have a statistically significant effect on salaries. Given the sensitivity 
of these results, it is difficult to conclude that a strong positive relation between 
agency growth and salaries  exist^.^ 
A principal weakness of the agency growth-salary  hypothesis is that it fails 
to consider sufficiently  the  institutional environment. We point out two im- 
portant examples. First, at least within  the federal government,  a pyramidal 
position  structure, such as the General Schedule, does not imply pyramidal 
promotion opportunities. Under the civil service system, seniority within the 
federal  government  is so heavily  weighted  in promotion  determination  and 
salary-step increases that individuals who meet basic job qualification require- 
ments will be advanced in many cases, regardless of what happens to agency 
size. Moreover, although in-grade step promotions are practically  automatic, 
in other cases educational qualifications can impose severe restrictions on the 
upward mobility of federal workers. Finally, as outlined by civil service rules, 
ports of entry  into the federal white-collar labor force exist throughout the 
range of  GS grades, not just at that lower levels. Competition from new en- 
trants could mitigate any positive effects that agency growth might otherwise 
have for the promotion of existing workers. 
Second, under the civil service system, GS employees are paid according to 
a national pay plan, and government-employee  salary increases typically have 
been in the form of across-the-board percentage adjustments. There is no spe- 
cific link to agency characteristics in salary determination. Thus, any connec- 
tion between government growth and salary increases would depend, instead, 
on the expansion of the total General  Schedule labor force, not just on the 
growth of a particular agency. 
It is conceivable that broad increases in the demand for government services 
could require higher salaries in order to staff new government positions. These 
conditions would force the president and the Congress to support new pay leg- 
islation. The size of  the salary increase needed, of  course, would depend on 
labor supply conditions. 
We  examine  the  relation  between  total  federal  employment  growth  and 
expansion of federal salaries. Table 6.3 reports regression results, where the 
dependent variable is the average annual, legislated percentage increase in pay 
for General Schedule employees from 1949 to 1990. These pay increases were 
regressed against the annual rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, and cur- 
rent and lagged annual rates of growth of total GS employment. Over the sam- 
ple period, total GS employment expanded by 83 percent. Again, however, the 
evidence  fails  to  support  a  positive  relation  between  salary  increases  and 
staffing growth. None of the coefficients on the employment-growth variables 
is statistically significant from zero at the 5 percent level. 
Certainly, there are some positions and special occupations for which the 
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Table 6.3  General Schedule Pay Legislation and Employment Growth, 1949-90 
Constant term 





Unemployment rate, t  -  .32 
GS employment growth, t  .04 
(- 1.27) 
(.25) 
GS employment growth, t -  1  ... 















Sources und notes: The average annual GS legislated pay increase is from US.  Office of Personnel 
Management (1989). The rate of inflation was calculated using the GNP deflator. The source for 
the GNP deflator and the unemployment rate is the Economic Report offhe  President. GS employ- 
ment is from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Both reported regressions were corrected for autocor- 
relation in the residuals. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
sion.I0 These conditions have helped federal labor unions  in their efforts to 
secure legislated across-the-board pay increases that benefit  their members. 
Further, if the federal government expanded into areas where federal pay was 
not competitive, there could be pressures on Congress to increase the salaries 
of all GS employees, but this seems unlikely to be a source of major change in 
wages  for GS employees.  Some blue-collar  government  workers  may  have 
more incentive to promote the advance of government into new areas because 
they are paid under the Federal Wage System with its concept of meeting lo- 
cally prevailing rates. All in all, however, the growth of the federal government 
does not appear to be the key for explaining the continued existence of a fed- 
eral wage advantage, relative to that of state and local employees. 
There is additional evidence on this issue. Consider, for example, what has 
happened over time to federal, state, and local relative wages and employment 
growth. The ratio of federal to state and local government salaries can be com- 
puted using national income and product account (NIPA) data. While these 
measures do not control for changing characteristics of  each sector's  work- 
force, they offer a consistent times  series of the ratio of federal (including 
postal) to state and local employee wages. The average value of the ratio for 
the period  1949-90  was  1.30. Between  1949 and  1990, total federal civilian 
employment, both full and part time, increased by 63 percent. In contrast, state 
and local government employment grew by 292 percent. Nevertheless, despite 
sharp differences in the employment growth experience by the two sectors, the 
wage ratio remained within the relatively narrow bounds of 1.22-1.39 through- 
out the period."  In addition, during the same time, the number of employees 136  Chapter6 
in the private sector increased 131 percent. Hence, not only did state and local 
employment grow much faster than did federal, but the slow growth of federal 
employment, relative to the private sector, implies that the voting power of 
federal workers most likely declined. Federal workers appear to have main- 
tained their relative wage advantage independent of what was  happening to 
their voting power or the expansion of government.12 
Of course, it follows that, if the growth-salary linkage in the public sector is 
as weak as the evidence presented here suggests, public-sector voters would 
have little incentive to vote for the expansion of government, at least to facili- 
tate advancement. They may, however, support the growth of government for 
other reasons. Although the evidence on the preferences of government work- 
ers for increases in the size of the public sector is limited, it does not indicate 
a strong desire for the expansion of government. For example, when Courant, 
Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1980), examined a survey of  Michigan voters re- 
garding state and local government tax limitations, they found little difference 
between the preferences of state employees and those of the general electorate. 
Both groups preferred a reduction in state expenditures. State and local em- 
ployees, however, desire a small increase in local government spending, while 
private-sector voters wanted a decrease. A much broader study is that of Blais, 
Blake, and Dion (1991), who examined voter preferences for the expansion of 
government in the United States and other countries. In their analysis for the 
United States, they assumed that Democratic party candidates were pro-growth 
and that voters who backed them were also pro-growth. The evidence that they 
mustered indicated that there was a tendency for public-sector employees to 
support Democratic candidates but that the link was modest at best. 
When considered in its entirety, the evidence presented in this section does 
not support the hypothesis that public-sector employees have a strong incentive 
to use their voting power to promote the growth of government, with the objec- 
tive of increasing their salaries. At least, this relation does not appear to be key 
for understanding the success of federal workers in obtaining comparatively 
high levels of compensation. Indeed, it is not at all clear why promoting public- 
sector growth would be the preferred route to higher salaries, rather than re- 
stricting the supply of  government ~0rkers.l~  As both  Tullock (1974) and 
Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1980) have pointed out, there are likely to 
be limits to or an optimum size for the bureaucracy. If this limit were exceeded, 
a lower wage structure would result. Even in these models, however, the voting 
power of government workers is emphasized as a factor in determining the size 
of the bureaucracy. In contrast, we have shown that voting power alone cannot 
explain the success of  federal workers. They appear, instead, to have relied 
more on lobbying to achieve their goals in the public arena. 137  Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
6.3  Federal Workers: An Effective Interest Group 
6.3.1  The Characteristics of Effective Interest Groups 
In order to understand why federal employee unions seem to have been espe- 
cially effective in the political arena, it is worthwhile reviewing some of  the 
literature on interest groups. One common characteristic of successful interest 
groups is that they are small, relative to the group opposing them, and homoge- 
neous. In  setting regulation policy, and in other policy areas as well, small 
groups often seem capable of  dominating larger ones. Sam Peltzman (1976) 
explains this phenomenon by  showing that, in the political process, a small 
group with a large per capita stake in the outcome can outperform a much 
larger group, whose interests are diffused. Voting power matters in Peltzman’s 
model, but voting is most often on a package of issues, and there are costs to 
being informed on each of them. Voters with a small per capita stake in  the 
outcome are unlikely to expend substantial resources in becoming informed or 
in attempting to block the efforts of  a group whose members have  more at 
stake on a particular issue. Because of the free-rider problem, the small group 
will be relatively better at organizing its voters and in raising campaign funds 
to support selected officials. Vote-maximizing politicians can use these cam- 
paign  resources to increase their probability  of  winning an election by  at- 
tracting uninformed voters. Thus, campaign contributions and other political 
activities from small interest groups can make up for the lack of  raw voting 
power.I4 
6.3.2  Federal Employees as an Interest Group and Their 
Political Environment 
A large per capita stake in the outcome and organizational clout, generally 
enhanced by relatively small group size and homogeneity, are important char- 
acteristics of successful interest groups. As we will see, federal career employ- 
ees, as a group, have some of these characteristics, but not all. 
First, consider the constraints that they face. At over 3 million strong, they 
are not a small group. Furthermore, lobbying activities are carried out by fed- 
eral employee unions, but, as we indicated in chapter 5, not all federal employ- 
ees who are represented are union members. Although the proportion of fed- 
eral workers represented by unions is high, especially when compared to the 
private sector, many of  those who are in exclusive bargaining units are not 
actual dues-paying members.15  While Congress has allowed the “union shop,” 
it has not required nonmembers to pay monthly fees that are equal to union 
dues, as is practiced in the private sector. Federal unions also do not have at 
their disposal the same arsenal as private-sector unions. They cannot offer to 
engage in collective bargaining over salaries or benefits. Federal salaries in- 
stead are set by  statute, and the unions are prohibited by  law from striking.16 138  Chapter6 
Moreover, until recently, federal unions were less able to use peer group pres- 
sure to raise campaign contributions.  Under the Hatch Act, federal workers 
were constrained in their political activities. They were free to vote, to express 
their political views as citizens, to attend political rallies (as spectators only), 
and to contribute money to partisan  political  campaigns, but they could not 
solicit campaign contributions  that could be used by  federal unions  or em- 
ployee groups in political action. 
Despite these constraints, federal employee unions have developed as a for- 
midable political force. As Gary Becker has pointed out, “The political effec- 
tiveness of a group is mainly determined not by its absolute efficiency . . . but 
by its efficiency relative to the efficiency of other groups” (1983,380). Becker 
was referring to the relative ability of interest groups to control the free-rider 
problem and to the potential gains that they could capture relative to the costs 
(including the deadweight costs associated with the transfer) that they imposed 
on opposing parties. According to Becker, those interest groups that are better 
able to control free riding and  increase the returns and reduce the costs of 
transfers will be more effective at exerting political influence. 
Because federal unions are concerned with civil service rules and salaries 
and benefits for the general bureaucracy, their efforts generally do not antago- 
nize any specific constituent group. That is, they are not seen as lobbying for 
specific benefits from particular agencies that might crowd out or otherwise 
harm competing special interests. Accordingly, the lobbying efforts of federal 
unions typically do not ignite opposition from well-organized interest groups.18 
The main group affected by  the actions of federal employee unions  in ob- 
taining preferential pay,  benefits,  and work rules is general  taxpayers. Com- 
pared with general taxpayers, federal workers as a group are small and much 
more homogeneous. Moreover, they have high per capita stakes in civil service 
and federal salary legislation, while the per capita costs to general taxpayers 
of any one bill are small. These conditions provide general taxpayers with little 
incentive to collect accurate information about the costs of federal salary stat- 
utes or civil service laws, and the individual costs of gaining such information 
are high. 
Peltzman, Becker, and others have stressed that a lack of  information and 
the incentive to collect it on the part of the general electorate is a key to under- 
standing the success of special interest groups. This situation provides a partial 
explanation for the general salary advantage of federal rank-and-file employees 
over their counterparts in state and local governments. We expect citizen disin- 
terest in legislation regarding bureaucratic rules and salaries to be greater at 
the federal level than at the state and local level. 
There are far fewer federal employees than the aggregate  state and local 
total, and, as we have indicated, they are fairly evenly spread across the coun- 
try. Firsthand or direct knowledge by  taxpayers of a significant federal wage 
advantage is ~nlike1y.I~  Further,  despite generally higher individual salaries, 
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employees. In  1990, for example, total wages paid to state and local workers 
amounted to $355 billion, while total wages paid to federal civilian plus gov- 
ernment enterprise workers were $10 1 billion (national income and product 
accounts, computer data files, updated 1991). Moreover, the federal wage bill 
is spread across all taxpayers, and it accounts for only a small part of total 
federal expenditures. In 1988, expenditures for wages and salaries at the fed- 
eral level, including defense, were around 11 percent of total expenditures. The 
corresponding figure for state and local governments was around 35 percent 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1988). 
Accordingly, not only are the pay and performance of government workers 
more visible to state and local government taxpayers, but those taxpayers also 
have more reasons to be concerned and to collect information about them. This 
suggests that a state and local politician is more likely to be held directly ac- 
countable for increases in government wages than is a member of  Congress. 
The latter is just one out of close to 500 elected federal officials, and, if the 
general electorate is disinterested in federal pay issues, so too will be elected 
officials. 
Although direct evidence on just how disinterested federal officials are in 
civil service issues is difficult to come by, the lack of attention to these issues 
by  most members of the Congress is apparent. Few members of the House 
seek assignment to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and Con- 
gress as a whole appears to be largely unconcerned with pay  and promotion 
issues. Consider, for example, the practice of grade inflation whereby supervi- 
sors routinely reclassify positions to higher GS grades than the position would 
otherwise waq-ant. Concern over grade inflation has been expressed in numer- 
ous federal studies by monitoring agencies. The U.S. Office of Personnel Man- 
agement (1983, 4), for example, estimated that 14.3 percent of  audited posi- 
tions  were  overgraded.  The  U.S.  Congressional  Budget  Office  (1984,  9) 
charged that recent increases in the average GS grade were the result of super- 
visors responding to pressures to compensate workers for departures from pay 
comparability with the private sector, as mandated by the Federal Pay Compa- 
rability Act 1970. At least in part through grade inflation, the average GS grade 
has risen. For example, in only four years, the average GS grade rose from 8.16 
in  1980 to 8.39 in  1984.*" We compared the salaries of  GS employees with 
identical characteristics in 1980 and again in 1985, using the same data set and 
variables described in appendix C (see also Johnson and Libecap 1989b). The 
results indicate that grade inflation contributed an additional 3 percent more to 
the salary of the typical GS employee than had been authorized by the Con- 
gress. Nevertheless, even though the existence of grade inflation has been re- 
ported to the Congress on numerous occasions, no real effort has been under- 
taken to curtail the practice, and it has continued. By 1989, for instance, the 
average GS grade had increased to 8.69 (US. Office of Personnel Management 
1989, 10). 
While federal taxpayers and their congressional representatives may be gen- 140  Chapter6 
erally unconcerned about pay  issues in the federal bureaucracy, federal em- 
ployee unions are not. They work to develop close ties with specific members 
of  Congress, especially those on the Postal and Civil Service Committees. 
Richard Fenno notes, “Congressmen who ask for membership on the Interior 
and Post Office Committees have the primary goal of helping their constituents 
and thereby  insuring their reelection” (1973, 5). Although the committees 
dealing with civil service matters are not usually thought of as being the most 
preferred assignments, there is a tendency for members of Congress who have 
a relatively high proportion of federal workers residing in their districts to be 
members of  those committees.21  Moreover, because committee members are 
targeted by federal unions for special attention, having a major say over federal 
wage policy has its rewards.22  As indicated by  their presence in hearings on 
relevant legislation, federal unions closely monitor the actions of those mem- 
bers of  Congress. In exchange for favorable legislation, federal unions offer 
political support in the form of articles and editorials in union newspapers and 
campaign activities by  federal employees’ spouses and friends who are not 
subject to Hatch Act c~nstraints.~~  In  addition, federal unions, just  like the 
larger  national  labor  unions,  have  their  own  political  action  committees 
(PACs), and these are not small. 
Table 6.4 lists the top five federal employee PACs by the amount actually 
given to federal candidates. Although collectively the amounts given are large, 
it is the pattern of the campaign contributions that is most revealing. Data on 
the amount contributed by each of the five PACs listed in the table to individual 
members of  the House and Senate are available from the Federal Elections 
Coqmission. If, as described above, these PACs focus their attention on mem- 
bers of the committees most directly concerned with civil service matters, then 
contributions to members of those committees should be higher than they are 
for nonmembers. 
Consider first contributions to members of  the House of  Representatives. 
Since not all members received contributions, we utilize a tobit (censored re- 
gression) model to examine the relation between PAC contributions and mem- 
bership on the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Besides a 
qualitative variable for committee membership, the regression variables in- 
clude a political party identifier (set equal to one if a Democrat) and a variable 
to account for the number of federal civilian employees residing in the mem- 
ber’s  district. The latter variable is included because interest groups supply 
both votes and money, which can be thought of as either substitutes or compli- 
ment~.*~  Tables 6.5-6.7  report separate results of tobit regressions for each of 
the three election cycles (1985-86,  1987-88,  and 1989-90,  respectively) and 
for each individual PAC. The first dependent variable in all three tables is the 
sum of contributions from all five PACs. While the results indicate that being 
a member of the Democratic party clearly increases PAC contributions, com- 
mittee membership also has a strong positive  Indeed, the coefficient 
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Table 6.4  Rank of Federal Union Political Action Committees in Terms of 
Contributions to Federal Candidates 
Election Cycle 
Letter Carriers Political 
Political Fund 
Action Fund 
Committee of the 
American Postal 
Workers Union 












1985-86  1987-88  1989-90 
Rank  Amount ($)  Rank  Amount ($)  Rank  Amount ($) 
3  1,491,875  4  1,732,482 
18  724,145  14  898,075 
22  504,455  26  398,280 
34  268,585  35  21  1,5 I5 
4  1,731,050 
12  964.828 
24  430,875 
46  161.774 
36  209,070  41  167,295  42  192,53 1 
Source: Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Note: Rank is based on all labor PACs. In addition to the above, the National Association of 
Retired Federal Qnployees Political Action Committee is a major contributor: contributions were 
$1,493,395  in  1985-86,  and the organization ranked fifth out of  all contributors to federal candi- 
dates. 
(at the 5 percent level) in all cases, strongly supporting the argument that fed- 
eral labor unions focus attention on these particular members of Congress. 
Table 6.8 presents the results of tobit regressions for PAC contributions to 
members of the Senate. Here, the relevant committee is the Subcommittee on 
Federal Services, Post Office and Civil Service of the Committee on Govern- 
mental Affairs. Because only one-third of the Senate is up for reelection in any 
given cycle, we combined all three election cycles (1985-86,  1987-88,  and 
1989-90), for a total of 300 observations.26  Also, the federal employment vari- 
able is now measured as the ratio of total federal employment in the state to 
state total civilian employment. Because the Senate is substantially smaller 
than the House of  Representatives, it is generally thought that the decision- 
making process there is less dependent on the committee  Floor 
debate, for example, is more common in the Senate than in the House. As a 
consequence, we should not expect the results for the committee variable for 
the Senate to be as strong as it was for the House. Nevertheless, the results in 
table 6.8 indicate that federal employee PACs are more likely to contribute to 142  Chapter6 
Table 6.5  Tobit Estimates of PAC Contributions to Members of the House, 
1985-86  Cycle 
Dependent Variable 
Variable  SUM  PAC1  PAC2  PAC3  PAC4  PAC5 
Member post office  9,653 
Democrat  8,487 
(13.16) 
Federal employment  .089 
(2.26) 
Constant  -4,419 
(-7.15) 





















-  ,006 
(- .49) 
-1,011  - 
(-5.45)  I 
1,830  1,908 
(8.22)  (5.98) 
1,078  2,297 
(3.71)  (7.63) 
,025  ,055 
(2.64)  (5.06) 
-2,365  -3,258 
:10.09)  (- 10.02) 
SEE  5,428  3,700  1,658  1,591  1,142  1,283 
Log-likelihood  -2,934  -2,251  -2,001  -1,019  -1,044  -1,019 
function 
contributions > 0 
observations 
Frequency of  .66  .52  SO  .54  .25  .25 
Number of  433  433  433  433  433  433 
Sources: Federal Elections Commission; Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1985590); and US. 
Department of Commerce (1983). 
Note: Reported regression coefficients were obtained by  multiplying the normalized coefficients 
by  the SEE. Asymptotic t-statistics are given in parentheses. SUM = total contributions from all 
five PACs; PAC1 = Letter Camers Political Action Fund; PAC2 = Political Fund Committee of 
the  American  Postal  Workers Union;  PAC3  = National  Rural  Letter  Carriers’  Association: 
PAC4 = American Federation of Government Employees; PAC5 = National Treasury Employees. 
committee members than to nonmembers.  The coefficient on the committee 
membership variable is positive in all cases and is statistically significant (at 
the 10 percent level) for four out of the five PACs. 
Focusing attention on committee members appears to have paid off for the 
federal unions. The legislative histories of recent and major civil service re- 
form bills indicate how important committee support can be to federal em- 
ployee unions. Final action on bills dealing with salary issues and civil service 
rules are often perfunctory, with little discussion on the floor of either chamber, 
and with bills passing by large margins. Debate and resolution are most gener- 
ally carried out in the relevant committees.28 
Federal employee unions have asserted that they could do more politically 
and, hence, be an even  stronger  lobbying group if the restrictive Hatch Act 
were repealed. In 1989, both the House and the Senate passed bills that would 
have permitted federal employees to raise money for and participate in political 
campaigns.29  These measures would have allowed federal workers, while off 
duty, to distribute campaign literature, to solicit votes, to endorse candidates, 
and to raise funds for political action committees. Hearings on the Hatch Act 
Reform Amendments of  1989 revealed that federal employee unions strongly 143  Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Table 6.6  Tobit Estimates of PAC Contributions to Members of the House, 
1987-88  Cycle 
Dependent Variable 
Variable  SUM  PACl  PAC2  PAC3  PAC4  PAC5 
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Sources: Federal Elections Commission; Congressiond Quarterly Almanac (1987-88);  and U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1983). 
Nore: Reported regression coefficients were obtained by  multiplying the normalized coefficients 
by  the SEE. Asymptotic r-statistics are given in parentheses. SUM = total contributions from all 
five PACs; PACl  = Letter Carriers Political Action Fund; PAC2 = Political Fund Committee of 
the  American  Postal  Workers  Union;  PAC3  = National  Rural  Letter  Carriers'  Association; 
PAC4 = American Federation of Government Employees; PAC5 = National Treasury Employees. 
supported the repeal while President Bush adamantly rejected it.30  Much of the 
testimony in support of the Hatch Act revisions emphasized that the law had a 
chilling effect on employee political participation. Although the evidence on 
voter participation rates presented in this chapter does not indicate that federal 
workers vote less than their counterparts  in the private sector, the Hatch Act 
has restricted their active involvement in political campaigns. 
Republicans  in both the House and the Senate argued that the Hatch Act 
reform was based largely on the desire of Democrats to increase the contribu- 
tions that they receive from federal employee PACS.~'  Nevertheless, both the 
House and the Senate versions passed their respective chambers by wide mar- 
gins and included the yes votes of a number of Republicans.'* President Bush, 
however, vetoed the bill, and the Senate, in a very close vote, failed to override 
it. But this defeat for the unions was short lived. 
In 1993,  both the House and the Senate again passed legislation that allowed 
greater political involvement by federal employees. (Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report, 25 September 1993, 2538). Under the compromise bill, how- 
ever, federal workers would still be prohibited from running for partisan elec- 
tive office, and supervisors would not be allowed to solicit funds from subordi- 
nates.  In  addition.  restrictions  were  maintained  for members of  the  Senior 144  Chapter6 
Table 6.7  Tobit Estimates of PAC Contributions to Members of the House, 
1989-90  Cycle 
Dependent Variable 
Variable  SUM  PAC 1  PAC2  PAC3  PAC4  PAC5 
Member post office 
and civil service  11,519 
Democrat  8,s  14 
(11.91) 
Federal employment  ,064 
(1.37) 
Constant  -2,559 
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SEE  6,343  3,860  2,395  1,497  1,415  1,630 
Log-likelihood 
function  -3,264  -2,917  -2,411  -2,002  -768  -851 
Frequency of 
contributions >  0  .72  .67  .58  .so  .I8  .20 
Number of 
observations  433  433  433  433  433  433 
Sources: Federal Elections Commission; Congressional  Quarterly Almanac  ( 1989-90);  and U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1983). 
Nore: Reported regression coefficients were obtained by multiplying the normalized coefficients 
by the SEE. Asymptotic r-statistics are given in parentheses. SUM = total contributions from all 
five PACs; PAC1 = Letter Carriers Political Action Fund; PAC2 = Political Fund Committee of 
the  American  Postal  Workers  Union;  PAC3  = National  Rural  Letter  Carriers’  Association; 
PAC$ = American Federation of Government Employees; PAC5 = National Treasury Employees. 
Executive Service and other sensitive positions. Nevertheless, the bill granted 
federal workers considerable leeway to engage in political activities during 
their off-duty hours. President Clinton signed the bill on 6 October 1993. 
The recent history of Hatch Act reform legislation illustrates the formidable 
political influence of federal employee unions. The efforts of the federal unions 
to repeal the legislative restrictions on the political activity of their members 
had wide support in the Congress. Although President Bush’s veto was main- 
tained in the Senate, the House voted to override by a margin of 327 to 93.33 
Returning to table 6.4, it is clear from the figures presented there that the 
postal workers are the most active of  federal unions and that they  are major 
contributors to candidates for federal office. Postal workers were, as we have 
explained, one of the first groups to unionize after the passage of the Pendleton 
Act, and they have been active ever since, even engaging in a massive and 
illegal strike in New York in 1970 (Nesbitt 1976, 386-90).  Unlike the GS pay 
plan, which has considerable variation in occupations, postal workers are a 
relatively homogeneous group, contributing to group solidarity. The campaign 
services that they have supplied to members of the Congress have apparently 145  Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
Table 6.8  Tobit Estimates of PAC Contributions to Members of the Senate 
Dependent Variable 
Variable  SUM  PACl  PAC2  PAC3  PAC4  PAC5 
Member federal  8,752 
services, post office  (2.05) 
and civil service 
Democrat  13,579 
(6.36) 
Federal employment/  17,045 
Constant  -11,993 
(-4.94) 









































SEE  15,227  6,630  5,303  4,992  3,558  4,346 
Log-likelihood function  -  1,538  -1,072  -1,027  -988  -622  -636 
Frequency of  .43  .32  .3  1  .30  .I9  .19 
Number of observations  300  300  300  300  300  300 
contributions >  0 
Sources: Federal Elections Commission; Congressional Quarterly Almanac  (1  985-90);  and U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1983). 
Nore: Reported regression coefficients were obtained by  multiplying the normalized coefficients 
by the SEE. Asymptotic r-statistics are given in parentheses. SUM = total contributions from all 
five PACs; PACl  = Letter Carriers Political Action Fund; PAC2 = Political Fund Committee of 
the  American  Postal  Workers Union;  PAC3  = National  Rural  Letter  Carriers'  Association; 
PAC4 = American Federation of Government Employees; PAC5 = National Treasury Employees. 
paid off; posta!  employees'  earnings are substantially higher than those of their 
private-sector counterparts (see Wachter and Perloff 1992). 
In comparisons among federal workers, however, postal workers do not ap- 
pear to receive a wage premium.34  This outcome is consistent, at least over the 
long run, with the notion that the postal workers have been trendsetters,  in 
terms of compensation, for all federal civilian workers. It also points out how 
important is the concept of wage comparability to federal workers and why 
they have fought for legislation that requires it. With mandated wage compara- 
bility, the success of one group is likely to benefit others. In the political arena, 
the concept of wage comparability  with its connotation of equality is not a 
concept that can be easily attacked by most elected officials. The wage regres- 
sion studies summarized in chapter  5  support this  argument. Those studies 
indicate that the relative federavprivate-sector  wage advantage is greater for 
women and minorities than it is for white males, yielding greater equality of 
wages in the federal sector. It is also important to note that, in the public sector, 
the uniodnonunion wage gap is less than the wage gap found in the private 
One possible explanation for this is that spillover effects are greater 
in the public  sector because elected officials are more easily pressured into 
concessions that tend to equalize pay than private-sector employers. 
In their lobbying efforts, federal unions also receive important support from 146  Chapter6 
organized labor. Indeed, there  is a sort  of  symbiotic relation among labor 
unions, and most federal unions are closely aligned with larger private-sector 
unions.3h  In the private sector, unions have supported one another through sym- 
pathy strikes, work slowdowns, and company boycotts. Such actions appear 
costly, compared to the support that private-sector and federal unions can pro- 
vide one another in the political arena. Given restrictions on strikes and collec- 
tive bargaining in the federal sector, the focus is on legislation. In the political 
arena, votes and campaign contributions are what count, and both federal and 
private unions have become adept in political maneuvering. 
An example of collaborative union action is Executive Order 10988, issued 
by President Kennedy in 1962 to recognize federal unions. As we pointed out 
in chapter 5,  organized labor played a key role in securing presidential candi- 
date Kennedy’s support for federal union recognition, by offering votes in ex- 
change for his promise to act on the issue. Organized labor also monitors the 
roll-call voting behavior of members of Congress on issues related to labor in 
general and reports the findings to their rank-and-file members. Similarly, fed- 
eral unions rank politicians, not only on their support for issues directly affect- 
ing federal workers, but also on issues affecting organized labor in general.37 
Private-sector unions make substantial campaign contributions to many federal 
politicians,  and how these elected officials vote on issues related  to federal 
workers can be taken as a sign of their support or opposition to organized labor 
more generally. 
State and local government workers benefit much less from this sort of col- 
laboration. Organized  labor is not as active in state and local governments. 
Although labor issues are not unimportant at the state and local level, orga- 
nized labor especially has sought favorable legislation from the federal govern- 
ment. With many jurisdictions, an organized lobbying effort across most of the 
states, for example, would be very costly. More important, federal actions set 
precedents that state laws do not, and resources are more mobile across state 
lines than they are across international boundaries, suggesting that federal poli- 
ticians would be less concerned about the cost effects of labor legislation than 
would be state politicians. For these reasons, focus on the federal government 
is the more effective choice. This focus, in turn, implies that organized labor 
will spend more effort on scrutinizing and promoting federal politicians than 
on state and local politicians. The attention given to federal politicians by orga- 
nized labor benefits federal workers by increasing their ability to exert political 
pressure. In contrast, the comparatively lower interest of organized labor in 
state and local governments means that the opportunities to join forces with 
local government workers are fewer, reducing their relative effectiveness as 
political lobbyists. 
The issue of  limited factor mobility at the federal level has other implica- 
tions and deserves more discussion. Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1  979) 
have argued that increases in public-sector wages are constrained by the mobil- 
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exit of residents and businesses (the Tiebout adjustment) to discipline elected 
officials seems greater at the state and local level. Not only is there consider- 
able tax competition across states and localities, but the negative effects of 
state and local taxes on capital formation and personal income are substantially 
greater when expenditures are used for the explicit purpose of transferring in- 
come.3x  Wage premiums in the public sector would appear to fit that category. 
Moreover, the pressures on elected officials to curtail expenditures are far more 
apparent at the state and local level than at the federal. Tax-limitation legisla- 
tion, such as California’s Proposition  13, has proliferated across the country 
since the late  1970s. The implications of this discussion are clear. Because 
factor mobility is less at the federal level, the derived demand for the services 
of federal  workers  is also likely  to be less elastic, and this condition gives 
federal unions greater power.39 
There have been numerous studies that have estimated the elasticity of de- 
mand for public-sector workers at the state and local level (see Ehrenberg and 
Schwarz 1986). All these studies report well-behaved demand functions, with 
negative  wage elasticities. In contrast, the number of  published  studies that 
report estimates of demand elasticities for federal workers is extremely rare. 
Indeed, Freeman, who reports estimated demand functions for state and local 
employment using NIPA data, notes that the regressions for the federal sector 
yield “quite different results” (1987, 202). Our own efforts at estimating fed- 
eral employment demand, using variables similar to those used by Freeman for 
his state and local equations  (total budget  expenditures, the unemployment 
rate, and the rate of inflation), produced a positive, but not statistically signifi- 
cant, coefficient on the federal wage variable. The analysis and data presented 
by Larry Katz and Alan Krueger (1991,  1992) also reveal substantial differ- 
ences between the two jurisdictions.  Although Katz and Krueger do not esti- 
mate employment demand functions, the comparisons  that they make show 
that federal wages are far less responsive to economic conditions and changes 
in private-sector wages than are state and local wages. Thus, the available em- 
pirical evidence supports the argument that employment demand at the federal 
level is less elastic than for state and local employees, and this condition contri- 
butes to the relative effectiveness of federal workers as an interest group. 
Finally, it is important to note that the desires of federal unions in lobbying 
for civil service and related pay legislation often coincide with the interests of 
the Congress and the president, but for different reasons. As we have sug- 
gested, the president and the Congress compete for control of the federal bu- 
reaucracy, particularly senior career officials, who are in a position potentially 
to mold and direct policy. To limit the opportunistic manipulation of  senior 
members of the bureaucracy, the president and the Congress have supported 
legislation that limits their ability to access and pressure bureaucrats. As we 
explain in chapter 7 they have an incentive to support tenure guarantees against 
arbitrary removal and salary caps to limit the rewards that might be offered to 
senior officials in exchange for certain administrative actions. Federal unions, 148  Chapter6 
whose membership is drawn largely from the rank and file, not from the senior 
levels, however, favor similar legislative provisions. They have sought tenure 
guarantees for their  members,  even though the rank and file are much  less 
likely to be the targets of presidential and congressional competition. More- 
over, salary caps for senior officials have served to assist unions in achieving a 
more egalitarian  wage  structure within the bureaucracy. Additionally,  as the 
salary caps have contributed to an inability of the federal government to keep 
or hire  senior  officials, the popular  solution  has been  to raise  all  salaries 
through across-the-board percentage  increases.4O Hence, the salary caps have 
provided a convenient mechanism for federal unions to focus the attention of 
Congress on wage increases for their members. 
6.3.3  Summary 
The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that relative interest group 
effectiveness,  not  voting power  or the growth  of  government,  explains the 
higher salaries achieved by federal workers compared to those paid to state 
and local employees. A major reason why federal unions are so effective is 
that they face relatively low costs in exerting political influence. Federal work- 
ers are a less conspicuous group to the general electorate, both in terms of their 
numbers and as a percentage of total budget expenditures, than are state and 
local government employees, and factor resources are less mobile at the federal 
level. In addition, both the president and the Congress appear receptive to leg- 
islation  that can  serve to demonstrate political  support for benefits  that  are 
popuiar among the broader workforce. How well federal workers are treated 
provides a signal to organized labor that supplies both votes and funds to fed- 
eral politicians. All these factors contribute to making the employment demand 
function at the federal level less elastic than it is at the state and local level. 
Federal workers have been organized to lobby Congress since the turn of  the 
century, and they have been able to take advantage of these conditions to pres- 
sure for higher wages  and other workplace  benefits under the  civil  service 
system. 
Notes 
1.  We  use the term voting power loosely and measure it as a simple ratio, such as 
the ratio of public-sector workers to the total labor force. A more precise measure would 
adjust for voter participation rates, family ties, and other factors and include the entire 
voting population. See, e.g., the voting power index suggested by  Bush and Denzau 
(1977). Given the vast differences in the numbers of  federal workers relative to the 
entire workforce or in relation to state and local employment, there is little to be gained 
for our purposes by such refinements. 
2. Most studies that compare federal government salaries with state and local gov- 149  Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
ernment salaries use CPS data and log-linear earnings regressions with demographic, 
occupational, and other controls. The studies summarized by Ehrenberg and Schwarz 
(1986, 1249) indicate that the federal/private wage differential is around 15 percent for 
males and 24 percent for females. The statelprivate wage differentials are negative for 
males and around 10 percent for females. At the local government level, the wage dif- 
ferentials are negative for males and close to zero for females. Similar findings are 
reported  by  Freeman  (1987,  192). The following percentage  wage differentials  for 
federal/private-sector employees are based on his table 8.5B: 
Type  1972  1977  1982 
Federal public administration  31  26  20 
State public administration  5  7  6 
Local public administration  -5  6  10 
Teacher  -1  -7  -11 
Postal  25  32  35 
This table indicates a substantial advantage for all types of federal civilian employees 
relative to state and local workers. See also the more recent estimates offered by Katz 
and Krueger (1991, 1992). While Katz and Krueger do not report an aggregate compari- 
son such as Freeman’s, their findings listed by gender, education, and experience reveal 
a federal wage advantage in all categories. 
3. This argument has a long history, but its current prominence can largely be attrib- 
uted to a collection of papers in a volume edited by Thomas Borcherding (1977). The 
lead paper in that volume is that of James Buchanan (1977, 14), who argues, “Bureau- 
crats are no different from other persons, and, like others, they will rationally vote to 
further their own interests as producers when given the opportunity. Clearly their inter- 
ests lie in an expanding governmental sector, and especially in one that expands the 
number of employees. Salaries, can be increased much more rapidly in an expanding 
agency than in a declining or stagnant one.” For a brief  survey of  the literature on 
bureaucracy and the growth of government, see Mueller (1989, 337-42). 
4. The major reason for the difference between the simple measures of voter partici- 
pation rates, which show federal workers voting at a higher rate than private-sector 
workers, and the probit estimates is that the latter control for the level of education and 
federal workers tend to be more highly educated than are private-sector voters. The 
level of education has a very strong positive effect on the probability of voting. See the 
probit results reported in app. D. 
5. Moreover, shirking is usually  thought  to be greater  in larger  groups than in 
smaller ones. See, e.g., the discussion by Olson (1965) and empirical evidence indicat- 
ing that group size negatively affects voter turnout in Hansen, Palfrey, and Rosenthal 
(1987). In 1980, there were approximately 3 million full- and part-time federal civilian, 
4 million state, and  10 million local government employees. Comparisons of federal, 
state, and local employment are from U.S. Bureau of the Census figures as reported in 
data files of the national income and product accounts. If we consider the entire nation 
as the relevant political jurisdiction for federal workers, then there is no other political 
jurisdiction,  state or local, with anywhere near the same number of public employees. 
The closest is the state of California, with 380,000 state employees. Thus, it is also 
plausible that federal workers are less likely to vote because of their larger group size. 
6. Employment figures are based on the 1980 census and are reported in U.S. De- 
partment of Commerce (1983), by state and congressional district. 
7. See Wolfinger (1972). Although patronage creates an added incentive for public 150  Chapter6 
employees to vote, the potential for free riding remains. However like politicians at the 
federal level in the nineteenth century, state and local politicians have an incentive to 
monitor the voting behavior of employees, and the failure of  an employee to vote  is 
taken as a sign of disloyalty. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone note, “Political machines 
often coerce their members to vote and keep records of their performance” (1980, 96). 
8. Young (1991) provides a comprehensive survey of studies dealing with the rela- 
tion between public-sector growth and salaries. In addition to our work, there is a study 
by Grandjean (1981), who analyzed a longitudinal sample of federal white-collar em- 
ployees. While Grandjean reports results for only a few major agencies, his findings 
suggest that agency earnings differentials have little to do with fluctuations in agency 
size. 
9. While there is evidence indicating that the size of a political entity, in terms of 
its budget, has a positive effect on salaries (Freeman 1987), there is no direct evidence 
supporting a positive growth-salary relation at the state or local level. It has, however, 
been suggested in the labor literature that public-sector unions are capable of influenc- 
ing not only the supply of  labor but its demand as well. Supposedly, increasing the 
demand for labor can lead to an increase in employment and wages simultaneously. 
There is some evidence indicating that unions at the municipal level have increased 
employment  (Zax  and  Ichniowski  1988), leading  some  to  argue  that  public-sector 
unions both desire to increase employment and have the political clout to do so. More 
recent evidence, however, questions those results and indicates that the observed effect 
may be due largely to endogenous choice, whereby unionization is more likely to occur 
in larger municipalities (Trejo 1991). 
10. On problems in hiring and retaining scientists and engineers, see Campbell and 
Dix (1990). Also, this is a long-standing problem. Many senior management and pro- 
fessional groups have testified about the problems due to salary compression (U.S.  Sen- 
ate 1949). And salary is an often-stated reason for leaving the Senior Executive Service 
(SES) and other higher-ranking positions (US. Merit Systems Protection Board 1989, 
1990). 
11. The federal relative wage advantage did, however, decline in the  1980s. This 
decline is also consistent with the results reported by Katz and Krueger (1992), who 
used CPS data and earnings regressions to compare federal salaries with those of state 
and local employees. Nevertheless, this decline does not appear to be related to  an 
increase in the rate of employment growth at the state and local level. The most rapid 
period of  expansion for state and local employment was in  the  1960s and the early 
1970s. This was also the time when the federal wage advantage was the greatest. 
12. Despite substantial differences in rates of employment growth, changes in the 
relative size of these two public groups had no effect on their relative wages. Regressing 
Y,, the ratio of  the federal wage to state and local wages, on X,, the ratio of federal 
employment to state and local, yielded the following results (t-statistics are given in pa- 
rentheses): 
Y, = 1. 33 -  0.13X,. 
(22.5) (-0.9) 
13. The available evidence suggests that private-sector unions do not contract for 
added employment (Wessels 1991). 
14. Becker also has a model of competition among pressure groups for political fa- 
vors that emphasizes small group size and large campaign contributions as a major 
determinant. Indeed, he does not consider the constraint of majority voting important 
because “voter preferences are frequently not a crucial independenr force in political 
behavior. These preferences can be manipulated and created through the information 
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15. See Freeman (1986). For example, the number of employees represented by the 
American Federation  of  Government Employees is around 700,000. The number of 
active dues-paying members, however, is much smaller, 210,000 (AFGE 1988). 
16. The right of state and local employee unions to strike is also greatly limited (see 
Freeman 1986). 
17. Removal of the constraint on soliciting funds has been the major motive behind 
recent attempts to amend the Hatch Act. The reform amendments are discussed later in 
the chapter. 
18. A reading of the congressional hearings for federal pay or civil service legislation 
reveals relatively little organized opposition from other interest groups. Federal unions 
and professional groups, as well as private-sector unions, dominate the testimony. Op- 
position has generally come only from the Civil Service Commission (now, the Office 
of Personnel Management) and the Bureau of the Budget (see, e.g., U.S. Senate 1962; 
and U.S. House 1970). We realize that, in the aggregate, the lobbying actions of federal 
unions do raise costs for other special interests because they affect the performance of 
government. Each statute regarding civil service rules or federal pay  applies govem- 
mentwide, with only an incremental effect on particular agencies or interests. Most 
special interests have direct competitors and must focus on them. 
19. Moreover, federal unions actively disseminate information that suggests that fed- 
eral employees are underpaid, relative to their private-sector counterparts, and that dis- 
putes studies made by economists. Federal unions can point to wage disparities at the 
senior level, where wage compression has led to lower federal salaries. Senior career 
officials tend not to be union members, and caps on their salaries reflect (as we argue) 
a desire of the president and the Congress to control the opportunistic manipulation 
of  senior administrators. Nevertheless, since the unions have an interest in providing 
information to taxpayers that indicates a salary discrepancy, more taxpayers are likely 
to believe that federal employees are underpaid rather than overpaid. For related discus- 
sion, see Lane and Wolf (1990) and Levitan and Noden (1983). 
20. While some of  this increase could be attributed to the hiring of  more highly 
skilled professional employees, much of it appears to be due to grade inflation, as the 
results from Johnson and Libecap (1989b) indicate. 
21. For example, we examined membership on the House Post Office and Civil Ser- 
vice Committee for the  Eighty-sixth  Congress  (1960)  through  the  lOlst Congress 
( 1988) to see whether representatives from the three districts surrounding Washington, 
D.C., were more likely to be on the committee. The test utilized compared the mean 
number of Congresses in which the three Washington, D.C.-area districts were repre- 
sented on the committee with the mean for other congressional districts that were repre- 
sented at least once on the committee. This provides for a somewhat stronger test than 
simply looking at all districts. The mean for the three Washington, D.C.,  districts was 
6.67 (standard deviation, 0.71) Congresses, while the mean for the other 130 districts 
represented at least once on the committee was 3.09 (standard deviation, 2.83). A t-test 
indicates that these means are significantly different at the  1 percent level. The data 
utilized are from the U.S. Bureau of  the Census, congressional district data for the 
various congresses. 
22. Fenno (1973, 42) points out that lobbyists for the postal service unions spend 
much of their time with members of Congress, who are on the committees most im- 
portant to their members and arrange testimonial dinners and other activities to raise 
funds and deliver votes. 
23. For a discussion of postal unions’ methods for influencing Congress, see Kappel 
Commission (1968,4:7.60-7.64). 
24. See the discussion offered by Stratmann (1992). His empirical evidence, which 
relates to agricultural PACs, indicates that campaign contributions at first increase with 152  Chapter 6 
the voting power of these interest groups but after a point decline with further increases 
in voting power. In addition to the results reported in tables 6.5-6.8  below, we also 
utilized a quadratic functional form for the federal employment variable. In none of the 
cases did the quadratic specification provide a better fit. 
25. That labor  PACs  contribute  more  to Democrats than  to Republicans is well 
known in the literature (see e.g., Peltzman 1984). 
26. Contributions were deflated using the CPI. 
27. Fenno notes,  “The root  institutional  differences between the Senate and the 
House are those of size, procedure, constituency, and tenure. They, in turn, combine to 
produce very different decisionmaking structures in the two chambers. The smaller size 
of the Senate makes it possible for each individual Senator to have more of  an impact 
on chamber decision making than the individual House member-both  as a matter of 
proportional weight and as a matter of procedural opportunity” (1973, 145-46). 
28. The legislative history of the Civil Service Reform Act of  1978 is illustrative. 
Lengthy hearings were held by  the various committees,  during which federal labor 
unions were given ample time to express their views (Congressional Quarterly Alma- 
nac  1978, 818-35).  The Senate approved the conference agreement on a voice vote, 
while the House passed it by a vote of 365 to 8. Action on the 1990 federal pay reform 
bill was similar (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1990,406-7). 
29. The House bill was H.R. 20 and the Senate version S. 135. For a brief history of 
this legislation, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1990, 408-1  1). 
30. Hearings on S. 135 contain testimony by the major federal employee unions list- 
ing support, while the Department of Justice, the Federal Election Commission, and 
other federal agencies stated their opposition (see U.S. Senate 1989). Joining in support 
of the measure was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which argued that the 
Hatch Act effectively denied federal employees the guarantee of freedom of  speech 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
3  1. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac (I  990,411) and U.S. Senate (1  989). The 
results offered in tables 6.5-6.8  clearly support the view that federal labor unions con- 
tribute more to Democrats. 
32. The House passed without amendment or conference the Senate version of H.R. 
20 by a vote of 334 to 87. There were ninety Republicans voting in favor (Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac 1990,410). 
33. On the Republican side, there were eighty-four votes in favor of the override, 
while ninety voted against the measure (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1990, 64- 
H). In  the Senate, the override vote failed to obtain the two-thirds majority needed. 
The final vote was 65 to 35, with ten Republicans voting for an override and thirty- 
five against. 
34. Borjas (1980) uses central personnel data files obtained from the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management and estimates agency earnings differentials across the federal 
government. His results do not indicate a major difference between the postal service 
and other federal agencies. The results reported by  Freeman (1987), who used CPS 
data, also show little or no difference between postal and other federal employees. 
35. See, e.g., the discussion of  these sector differences in Freeman (1986). Lewis 
(1990), however, points out that, while the gaps are smaller in the public sector, there 
are important exceptions. 
36. For example, the American Federation of  Government Employees is affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO. 
37. Consider, e.g., the following ten issues voted on by  the Senate in  1991 that the 
AFGE used for the purpose of ranking the members of that body: (1) Davis Bacon Act 
(amendments to); (2) Mexico Free Trade-Fast  Track; (3) Gag Rule (prohibited funding 153  Explaining the Success of Federal Employees as an Interest Group 
to clinics whose medical staff counseled on abortion; (4) Motor Voter Registration Act; 
(5) Unemployment Benefits Extension; (6) Capital Gains Tax Reduction; (7) Family 
and Medical Leave Act; (8) Family and Medical Leave-Substitute  Amendment; (9) 
Supreme Court Nomination-Clarence  Thomas; and (10) Unemployment Benefits Ex- 
tension-Veto  Override. Some of the issues used to rank members of the House of Rep- 
resentatives were somewhat more germane to federal workers as they dealt with work- 
ing conditions and use of drug testing by federal agencies. Nevertheless, the above list 
shows that the rankings given to federal politicians depend on a broad array of issues. 
The source for the above list is the “1991 AFGE Voting Record-First  Session-102nd 
Congress,” available from the AFGE, Washington, D.C. 
38. See, e.g., Newman (1983), Helms (1985), and Benson and Johnson (1986). These 
studies suggest that the magnitude of the effect of taxes on economic growth depends 
on what the tax revenue is being used for. Pure transfers have  a substantial negative 
effect. Since merely increasing the salaries of state and local workers would effectively 
amount to a transfer of income, the negative effects are likely to be greater than for 
other forms of expenditures. 
39. Becker’s (1983) point that successful interest groups will be relatively more effi- 
cient (have lower costs) is applicable here as well. Because the demand function is less 
elastic at the federal level, the deadweight costs that result from the distorting effects 
of taxes used to pay for higher wages are likely to be less. Hence, redistribution through 
higher wages is less costly at the federal level. 
40. As Congress considers pay legislation, for the reasons we have described in this 
chapter, it is politically difficult to enact salary increases just for the limited numbers 
of the most senior members of the bureaucracy. 